THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ANALYTICS AND COMPUTATION
IN THE STUDY OF CONGESTION EXTERNALITIES:
THE CASE OF THE EL FAROL PROBLEM
EDUARDO ZAMBRANO

University of Notre Dame and Banco Central de Venezuela

Abstract
In this paper I study the El Farol problem, a deterministic, boundedly
rational, multi-agent model of a resource subject to congestion exter
nalities that was initially studied computationally by Arthur (1994).
I represent the interaction as a game, compute the set of Nash equi
libria in mixed strategies of this game, and show analytically how the
method of inductive inference employed by the agents in Arthur’s
computer simulation leads the empirical distribution of aggregate
attendance to be like those in the set of Nash equilibria of the game.
This set contains only completely mixed strategy profiles, which ex
plains why aggregate attendance appears random in the computer
simulation even though its set-up is completely deterministic.

1. Introduction
In this paper I study a famous problem from the field of computational
economics known as the El Farol Problem, which is a model of bounded
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rationality posed by Brian Arthur (1994). In this problem agents employ a set
of predictors to forecast the actions of others over time and decide whether to
attend the “El Farol” bar based on their most accurate predictor of aggregate
attendance at each period. When each boundedly rational agent forecasts
that the bar is going to be too crowded, the agent decides not to go to the
bar, and vice versa.
The problem has the feature that no forecasting rule of deterministic
actions can be at the same time correct and available to all agents, and that
the sequence of outcomes that one obtains through (deterministic) computer
simulation of the problem looks more like a random process with a stationary
mean than a deterministic function.
There are several reasons why the El Farol problem is worth studying. The
first one is that the empirical distribution of aggregate behavior resulting from
the system of deterministic forecasting and decision is realization-equivalent to
the empirical distribution of aggregate behavior resulting from the mixedstrategy Nash equilibria of the underlying game, thereby providing a clear
link between equilibria in randomized strategies and the long-run behavior
of a collection of boundedly rational agents.
The second reason is that the bar in this problem is essentially a resource
subject to congestion, therefore making the problem a stylized version of the
central problems in public economics, such as those of traffic congestion and
congestion on computer networks like the Internet.1 As congestion of this
kind is routinely experienced in modern economies, a deeper understanding
of what transpires in computer simulations of the El Farol problem may help
us develop methods for understanding how resources subject to congestion
can be better managed in modern economies.
The third reason why the problem is worth studying is that it is regarded
as paradigmatic of those in the complex adaptive systems literature, for it
involves a fairly large number of intelligent and adaptive agents with local
information whose “forecasts (. . .) act to create the world they are trying
to forecast.”2 These systems include multi-agent systems (like the Internet),
ecological systems, common pool resources, and financial markets. For this
reason, the El Farol problem has generated a lot of attention from physicists
and computer scientists. Indeed, the mathematician John Casti has asserted
that “a decent mathematical formalism within which to describe and analyze

1
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the (. . .) El Farol problem would go a long way toward the creation of a
workable scientific theory of (complex, adaptive) systems.”3
Physicists and computer scientists work mainly in the context of a game
inspired by the El Farol problem deemed the minority game—a game in
which an odd number of players must join one of two groups. Each player
wins when he or she joins the group with a minority of the players.
Interestingly, many of the computer scientists and physicists involved in
this kind of research have had some resistance in employing the standard tools
of mathematical economics and game theory to study them. The reason is that
it has been argued that computational agents lack the kind of sophistication
that players are supposed to have according to game theory and therefore
game-theoretic predictions about what would arise in interactions among
computer agents would not be of use.4
This paper shows that this need not be the case, as the kind of algorithms
that define the manner in which computer agents interact over time can be
given a game-theoretic interpretation in a way that makes the behavior of a
collection of boundedly rational agents consistent with the equilibria of the
underlying game.
This is what the research reported in this paper has done for the case of
the El Farol problem. This suggests that the standard tools of game theory
should be of tremendous utility in understanding the rapidly growing world
of network-based computation and interaction.
To summarize, in this paper I study the El Farol problem, a determinis
tic, boundedly rational, multi-agent model of a resource subject to congestion
that was initially studied computationally by Arthur (1994). I represent the
interaction as a game, compute the set of Nash equilibria in mixed strate
gies of this game, and then show analytically how the method of inductive
inference employed by the agents in Arthur’s computer simulation leads the
empirical distribution of aggregate attendance to be like those distributions
in the set of Nash equilibria of the game. This set contains only completely
mixed strategy profiles, which helps to explain why aggregate attendance
appears random even though the set-up of Arthur’s computer simulation is
completely deterministic.
The ability to do this illustrates the nice interplay that exists between
computational modeling and mathematical analysis. Both the El Farol prob
lem and the Minority Game have been the subject of many computational
models. In this paper, I show how we can use mathematics to explain what
happens in these computational models. This should not be interpreted as
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a demonstration that mathematics always trumps computation. On the con
trary, the two are complementary. The computational models of Arthur and
others open a new set of questions and generate phenomena that we would
like to understand fully. The mathematics I present provides an explanation
of some dimensions of those phenomena. They erase some of the mystery.
In doing so, they enhance, not diminish, the discovery of the phenomena
themselves.
The structure of the rest of this paper is the following. In Section 2, I
present the details of the El Farol problem, in Section 3 I rewrite the El Farol
problem in game-theoretic terms, and in Section 4 I provide analytic results
that explain some characteristics of the empirical distribution of outcomes
over time. I provide a discussion of related work in Section 5 and offer con
clusions in Section 6.

2. The El Farol Problem
2.1. The El Farol Model

One hundred inhabitants of Santa Fe decide independently each week
whether to go to the bar El Farol, where it is known that a good evening
awaits if not too many people show up at the same time. Concretely, each
inhabitant goes to the bar if she expects fewer than 60 to show up, and stays
home otherwise. The only information available to every inhabitant at each
week is the number of people that went to the bar in the previous weeks.
To decide whether or not to go to the bar each inhabitant needs a method
to forecast attendance. However, the problem has the feature that no fore
casting rule of deterministic attendance can be at the same time correct and
available to all agents. To see why assume that the forecasting rule asserts that
60 or more individuals will show up at El Farol. Then nobody will go, thus in
validating the forecast. Similarly, if the forecasting rule asserts that less than 60
individuals will show up at the bar, then all will go, which again invalidates the
forecast. To deal with this difficulty Arthur (1994) allows each agent to “form
several predictors or hypotheses that map the past d weeks attendance figures
into next week’s.”5 Examples of possible predictors include the following:

� Predict next week’s attendance to be the same as last week’s;
� Predict an average of the last 4 weeks;
� Predict the same as 2 weeks ago.
At each period each individual uses the predictor that is “currently the
most accurate (. . .) in her set”6 (the so-called active predictor), and makes a
decision as to whether to attend the bar or not based on it. Arthur (1994) has
5
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the agents compute the accuracy of the predictors as follows: If s i is one of
the predictors for agent i, its accuracy at the end of period t is computed as
follows:
Ut (s i ) = λUt−1 (s i ) + (1 − λ)|s i (d(h t−1 )) − y t |
where h t−1 is the history of attendance up to period t − 1, d(h t−1 ) ∈ D, is the
attendance for the last d weeks (where d is a fixed number), D is the set of all
possible attendance profiles for the last d weeks, s i (d(h t−1 )) is the prediction
of predictor s i for period t given history h t−1 , y t is the actual attendance for
period t, and λ is a number strictly between zero and one. In other words,
Arthur (1994) computes the accuracy of each predictor at a given period as
a weighted average of the accuracy of the predictor in the previous period
and the absolute difference between the predictor’s last prediction and the
actual attendance.7
In this set-up, the collection of decisions of the agents determines each
week’s attendance figure, which is reported to all agents in the next period.
Then the figure is used by each agent to update the accuracies of her moni
tored predictors, and a new decision is made.
To analyze this model Arthur designs a computer experiment where he
first creates a finite but fairly large family of possible predictors, of which a
number of them are independently and identically distributed to each of the
100 agents. The forecasting rules given to the agents are diverse enough that
at every period each agent has at least a rule that forecasts an attendance
level below 60, and a rule that forecasts an attendance level of 60 or above.
Then, given starting conditions and the fixed set of predictors available to
each agent the overall dynamics is completely determined.
2.2. The Puzzle

When performing computer experiments of the “El Farol” problem Arthur
(1994) obtains the following:
Fact 1. Mean attendance always converges to 60, and
Fact 2. On average, 40% of the active predictors are forecasting above 60
and 60% below 60.
Casti in turn reports the third interesting feature of the problem, namely,
that the sequence of outcomes looks more like a random process than a
deterministic function, even though the set-up of the problem is entirely
deterministic.8 This, according to Casti, leads to the following conjectures:
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Figure 1: One hundred weeks of aggregate attendance according to the El Farol
simulation

Conjecture 1. The average number of people who actually go to the bar
converges to the threshold value as the number of periods becomes
large.
Conjecture 2. The time series on attendance levels is a deterministic ran
dom process, i.e., it is “chaotic.”9
There is a major obstacle to a resolution to these conjectures: Casti as
serts “there currently exists no mathematical formalism within which to even
meaningfully phrase these questions.”10
2.3. The Statistics

One of the messages of the present paper is that game theory is a useful for
malism for thinking about problems like the one studied by Arthur (1994).
Before presenting the precise game-theoretic representation of the interac
tion underlying the El Farol problem I briefly analyze statistically the outcome
of a typical run from Arthur’s code.
Figure 1 displays 100 weeks of aggregate attendance according to a run
of Arthur’s model. The mean attendance in the entire run (which consists
of 10,000 “weeks”) is 59.07 and the standard deviation is 12.8. The mean is
remarkably stable early in the run, as Figure 2 shows. It is noteworthy that,
while the mean is close to 60 (more precisely: within one to 60), it is not 60,
9
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Figure 2: Average of aggregate attendance over time in the El Farol simulation

as Fact 1 and Conjecture 1 would suggest. The long-run median, however, is
exactly 60. One could then rewrite Conjecture 1 as follows:
Conjecture 1 . The median number of people who actually go to the bar
converges to the threshold value as the number of periods becomes
large. The average number of people converges to a number that is
within one to the threshold.
Conjecture 2 suggests that a run obtained from Arthur’s code is “as if” it
was a realization of a stochastic process, even though Arthur’s setup is entirely
deterministic.
To verify this claim I ran a non-parametric test of whether in a typical
run from Arthur’s code the observations for aggregate attendance occur in
random order. If aggregate attendance is positively serially correlated it will
tend to remain above or below its median for several observations in a row.
On the other hand, if aggregate attendance is negatively serially correlated
observations above the median are likely to be followed by observations below
the median. Therefore, the number of times the time series of aggregate
attendance “crosses” the median cannot be either too high or too low under
the random order hypothesis (Swed and Eisenhart 1943).
The number of times aggregate attendance crosses the median in our
sample run of Arthur’s code of 10,000 weeks is 7,901 while the expected
value of crossings under the the null hypothesis of random order is about
5,000, numbers that are statistically different to any reasonable significance
level (the test’s z-statistic, which is approximately normal, was equal to
58.01).

Figure 3: Standard deviation of aggregate attendance over time in the El Farol simulation

Despite this, persistent fluctuations in the data remain, as evidenced by
the fact that the standard deviation of aggregate attendance over time is
bounded away from zero (Figure 3). Hence, while Conjecture 2 does not
seem to hold, the question remains as to why the persistent fluctuations in
the data do not vanish over time. One could write this as follows:
Conjecture 2  . The standard deviation of aggregate attendance is stable
over time and bounded away from zero.

3. Game Theory
3.1. The Prediction Game

A game G = N , (Ai ), (ui ) consists of a set N of players and, for each player
i, a finite action set Ai and a payoff function ui : Ai × A−i → , where A−i :=
 j=
 i A j , is the Cartesian product of the action sets of every player but i.
One can view the “El Farol” model as a game where the decision that
each player makes is one of either going or not going to the bar, subject to
the player’s forecast, and where the payoff of attending (respectively, not at
tending) when the bar is uncrowded (respectively, crowded) is greater than
the payoff of attending (respectively, not attending) when the bar is crowded
(respectively, uncrowded).11 Call this the attendance game. A more useful
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the related literature in Section 5.

representation, for the purpose of obtaining analytical results, is the following
representation:

� The strategy set for each player is the set of integers from 0 to 100.
� The payoffs for each player are measured as the negative of the absolute
difference between the player’s choice of strategy, and the number of
(other) players that chose a number smaller than 60.12 The number
of (other) players that chose a number smaller than 60 will be called
the “aggregate attendance.”
This description of the game underlying the “El Farol” model is called
the prediction game. The interpretation is, of course, that each player is trying
to predict how many other players chose, as their own prediction, a number
below 60.
While this representation seems substantially different than the atten
dance game, it turns out that they can be made to be equivalent when (i)
the game is repeated, (ii) the players are using Arthur’s method of belief
revision in the attendance game, and (iii) the players are using exponentially
weighted beliefs in the prediction game. This will be explored formally in
Theorem 3. Before investigating any of this, I consider some properties of
the equilibria of the prediction game.
LEMMA 1: The prediction game has no pure strategy equilibria.

Proof:

See the Appendix.

That the prediction game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibria is exactly
what the statement that “no forecasting rule of deterministic actions can be at
the same time correct and available to all agents” refers to. This is no proof that
“there is no deductively rational solution—no correct expectational model
[for this problem],”13 however, because there are many forecasting rules of
stochastic actions that can be at the same time correct and available to all
agents, namely, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the game.
LEMMA 2: The median number of players who choose a number less than 60 in any

mixed Nash equilibrium of the prediction game is exactly 60. The distance between the
median and the mean in any mixed Nash equilibrium is at most equal to 1.
Proof:

See the Appendix.
3.2. The Repeated Prediction Game

Now that we know a number of features of the prediction game let us consider
the repeated El Farol. The stage game is played every week, and to keep full
12
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Figure 4: One hundred weeks of aggregate attendance according to the symmetric Nash
equilibrium of the underlying game

consistency with Arthur’s framework, the players discount the future com
pletely. At the beginning of the week the only information available to every
player is the attendance in the previous weeks.
It is not hard to see that if any Nash equilibrium of the stage game is
played at every period, the path of play that one would observe would show
an average attendance of about 60, and obviously exhibits a variance of ag
gregate attendance over time that is bounded away from zero. To illustrate
this point I have simulated the aggregate attendance that arises in a Nash
equilibrium of the prediction game played repeatedly (Figure 4). That is,
this sequence exhibits similar properties that the empirical distribution of
aggregate attendance of the El Farol problem. Moreover, under the repre
sentation of the El Farol problem used in this paper, the statements “Mean
attendance always converges to 60,” and “On average, 40% of the active pre
dictors are forecasting above 60 and 60% below 60,” are, in fact, equivalent,
which implies that an explanation of why Fact 1 arises is at the same time an
explanation of why Fact 2 arises.
The statements in this last paragraph alone do not solve the problem
posed by Arthur’s simulation, however, because players in the computer ex
periments of the El Farol model done by Arthur (1994) do not use equilib
rium strategies of the repeated prediction game. This discussion, however,
clearly situates the problem as a game-theoretic one and, in particular, one
for which a satisfactory solution exists. The key to understanding how the
game-theoretic machinery can be used to shed light on a problem of this
nature is explained below.

3.2.1. Playing a Repeated Game
That agents in a repeated game are endowed with Bayesian rationality, but
not mutual knowledge of the strategies chosen by others, means that they are
endowed with a prior over the relevant uncertainty space of their decision
problems.
It turns out that the method of forecasting and decision used by the
agents in the El Farol model allows us to recover exactly the preferences and
beliefs underlying each agent’s choice.
THEOREM 1: The agents in the El Farol model behave exactly as if they are playing

the prediction game period after period, with beliefs about aggregate attendance given
by a variant of what is known in the literature of learning in games as “exponentially
weighted fictitious play.”
Proof: Notice that if each player i uses at each period the most accurate
predictor in her set, this means choosing s i to maximize Ut (s i ) at every
period t. But notice that Ut (s i ) = λUt−1 (s i ) + (1 − λ)|s i (d(h t−1 )) − y t |
can be written as
Ut (s i ) =

t


λt−τ u(s i (d(h τ −1 )), y τ )

τ =1

where u(s i (d(h τ −1 )), y τ ) = |s i (d(h τ −1 )) − y τ |. Maximizing Ut (s i ) by
λ
i
choice of s i is of course equivalent to maximizing 1−λ
t Ut (s ). Notice,
however, that if we define f t to be a probability distribution on the set
D × {0, 1, 2, . . . , 100} such that the forecast probability of attendance y at
date t + 1 and an attendance profile for the last d weeks of δ (up to week
t), is
t−1
λ 
λt−τ 1{y τ =y ,d(h τ −1 )=δ}
1 − λt τ =0

then 1 −λ λt Ut (s i ) is the expectation of u(s i (d˜), ỹ ), with respect to f t . Call
this expectation V (s i , f t ). Distribution f t is the exponentially weighted
fictitious play belief function, so that players at the end of every period t
i
choose strategy ŝ t+1
from the set arg maxs i V (s i , f t ); that is, they basically
behave according to the model known in the literature on learning in
games as “exponentially weighted fictitious play.” �
Nachbar (1999), Kalai, Lehrer, and Smorodinsky (1996), Nyarko (1997),
and Jordan (1997) have shown that any model of best-responding subject
to adaptive forecasts can be given a full Savage-Bayesian decision-theoretic
representation. The contribution of Theorem 1 goes beyond this in that it provides an
exact decision-theoretic representation of the behavioral rules that the players in the El
Farol model employ. Therefore, individual behavior in the El Farol problem is
consistent with Savage-Bayesian rationality. But there is more: the empirical

distribution of aggregate attendance over time in the model is consistent with
Nash equilibrium. This I will show in the following section.

4. When Learning Leads to Equilibrium
To study the long-run properties of the sequence of attendance it is useful
to define the regret that a player experiences from having played the actions
that he or she has actually chosen over time. Using an idea adapted from Hart
and Mas-Colell (2001), define the conditional expected regret from strategy s j
to s k at time t



1    k
DCti (s j , s k ) =
V s , f τ −1 − V s j , f τ −1 .
t τ ≤t: ŝ i =s j ,
τ

Notice that each bracketed term in the summation is non-positive since play
ers are best responding at every period τ to f τ −1 . Since expected payoffs are
linear in the probabilities,






1
1
DCti (s j , s k ) = V s k ,
f τ −1 − V s j ,
f τ −1 ≤ 0.
t τ ≤t: ŝ i =s j
t τ ≤t: ŝ i =s j
τ

τ

and by a proposition in Hart and Mas-Colell (2000, p. 1133), the average
belief, 1t
f (t), is a correlated equilibrium distribution (projected onto the
aggregate attendance levels) of the game being played.
From here it quickly follows that:
THEOREM 2: The empirical distribution of aggregate attendance converges to the

set of correlated equilibria of the prediction game.
Proof: Exponentially weighted fictitious play beliefs evolve over time accord
ing to the formula
f (t + 1) = f (t) +

(1 − λ)
[y t+1 − f (t)].
1 − λt+2

For large t, the denominator of the second summand can be ignored.
Therefore,
T
T
T
T
1 
1 
1 
1 
f (τ + 1) −
f (τ ) ≈ (1 − λ)
y τ +1 −
f (τ ) .
T τ =t
T τ =t
T τ =t
T τ =t

Since the average belief converges to a correlated equilibrium of the
game, the left-hand side of the previous equation converges to zero, and
hence the empirical distribution T1 Tτ =t y τ +1 converges together with
the average belief to the set of correlated equilibria, as well. �
The last step in understanding the behavior of the El Farol model is the
following:

THEOREM 3: The set of Nash equilibria and the set of correlated equilibria of the

prediction game coincide.
Proof:

See the Appendix.

The contribution of the last three theorems is that together they show
that the empirical distribution of attendance in the El Farol model converges
to the set of Nash equilibria of the prediction game. One should therefore
expect a median attendance equal to 60, an average attendance within 1 to
60, which explains Fact 1, Fact 2, and Conjecture 1 as outlined in section 2
of the paper. Moreover, all of these equilibria are in mixed strategies, which
explains why the standard deviation of aggregate attendance is bounded away
from zero, as posed in Conjecture 2 . This is so even though all players use
pure strategies period by period.
4.1. Remarks

It is important to comment on what the result does not say. First, it does
not say that the players have learned to predict the strategies chosen by the
others because players cannot recover the strategies chosen by others solely
by observing the time series of aggregate attendance.
Second, it does not even say that the players have learned to predict the
continuation path of play. This is in general a much stronger result that holds
for beliefs with very restricted support, as explained by Nachbar (1997, 1999).
Third, it does not say that the beliefs of the players converge to the set
of Nash equilibria of the game. Beliefs that are an exponentially smoothed
variant of fictitious play beliefs converge to a Nash equilibrium only if the
equilibrium is a pure strategy equilibrium. But this is impossible for the pre
diction game, since there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Fourth, it does not say that the players end up using the mixed strategies
that form the Nash equilibrium of the repeated game, or that the process of
aggregate attendance is random, for that matter. It does say, however, that
the empirical distribution of aggregate attendance has features that are just
as the features that arise in the empirical distribution induced by the set of
Nash equilibria of the game. This set is entirely composed of mixed strategies,
even though the forecasting rules are entirely deterministic. Therefore, the
analytic results from the present section explain the puzzling facts about the
El Farol model simulations, as are outlined in section 2.
While the techniques are somewhat different, the method used for ob
taining the result in Theorem 3 is related to results on the convergence of
empirical distributions to Nash and correlated equilibrium by Jordan (1997)
and Nyarko (1994), respectively. Those results do not apply to the present
paper directly, as some key hypotheses of those theorems regarding mutual
absolute continuity of the beliefs of the players are not readily verifiable for
the El Farol model. Those results, however, are the direct inspiration behind
the analysis in the present paper.

5. Related Literature
To enable the reader to contrast my results to those already available in the
literature on this problem, let me recall them here briefly. I have written the
El Farol model as a repeated game of prediction where beliefs about other
player’s predictions evolve according to exponentially smooth fictitious play
beliefs. This is not a variant on the El Farol problem: my representation
yields the exact behavioral rules used for decision making and prediction by
the players in Arthur (1994)’s simulation of the El Farol model. My repre
sentation also has the advantage that it allows me to analytically demonstrate
why aggregate attendance oscillates around 60 in the simulations, and why
the empirical distribution of outcomes appears to be generated by a random
process even though the set-up is completely deterministic. This is, in short,
the contribution of this paper.
The papers more directly related to the present work are Arthur (1994),
which I have already discussed, Greenwald et al. (2000), Edmonds (1999),
Bell et al. (2003), Farago et al. (2002), Johnson (1998), and Leady (2002).
All these papers contain either simulations, or analytical results to variants
on the El Farol problem, or both. None of them contain analytical results
related to the original simulation done by Arthur (1994).
Greenwald et al. (2000) study the El Farol problem with the purpose of
showing that rationality and predictability are incompatible in this game, in
the spirit of Nachbar (1997)’s seminal work. While they succeed in what they
attempt to do, this does not contradict the findings of the present paper.
This is so because players’ beliefs in the present paper, consistent with their
findings, do not converge to the truth. The average of the beliefs over time,
however, does converge to the set of correlated equilibria, and this is, in this
game, sufficient for the empirical distribution of attendance to converge to
the set of Nash equilibria of the game.
Edmonds (1999) endows the agents with an evolving set of predictors,
allows communication between the players, and studies the outcome of sim
ulations very much like the one by Arthur. His findings are consistent with
Arthur’s original findings regarding attendance oscillating around 60 in a
seemingly random fashion. While Edmonds suggests that the results in the
simulations are inconsistent with Bayesian rationality and equilibrium in the
limit, he focuses, like Greenwald et al. (2000) on actual play and actual beliefs
of the game, as opposed to average beliefs and the empirical distribution of
play, as in the present paper.
Bell et al. (2003) and Farago et al. (2002) treat the El Farol problem
as an engineering problem. Instead of trying to explain the outcome of the
simulations done by Arthur in game-theoretic terms, they are more interested
in studying what type of learning algorithms players could use for the system
to find their way to efficient and fair equilibria, and they succeed in finding
both deterministic and stochastic strategies for the players that do just this.
They also focus on the attendance game representation of the El Farol model.

Johnson et al. (1998) consider how the variance of attendance in the
simulations of the El Farol problem change in response to the number of
predictors available in the entire system and the number of predictors that
each agent selects.
Interestingly, Leady (2002) conducted experiments with human subjects
playing the attendance game representation of the El Farol model and got results
qualitatively similar to those from the simulations and the analytical results
presented in this paper: while the sequence of actions did not approach any
of the equilibria of the game, average attendance to the bar over time was
about 60%.

5.1. The Minority Game

An important paper in the literature is that of Challet and Zhang (1997),
which studies the variant on the El Farol problem discussed in the intro
duction called the “minority game” using tools from statistical physics. The
papers devoted to the minority game are too numerous to discuss here in
any detail (a website dedicated to the minority game, http://www.unifr.ch/
econophysics/minority/papers.html, contains more than 110 references to
papers devoted to its study). Let me recall briefly the contribution of three
papers from that strand of the literature that are relevant for understanding
what transpires in the El Farol problem.
Marsili, Challet, and Zecchina (1999) study the minority game under
alternative assumptions about whether the agents take into account their own
effect into aggregate outcomes. When the agents do take into account their
own effect into aggregate outcomes they obtain convergence of outcomes to
the Nash equilibria of the minority game while this does not happen when
agents ignore their own effect into aggregate outcomes. In this latter case
convergence is to a notion they call naive agents’ equilibrium, a point that is
associated with the maximization of a potential function, as in Hart and Mas
Colell (2001).
Shalizi and Albers (2003) use symbolic dynamics to study discrete adaptive
games like the minority game and show that there cannot be deterministic
chaos in the canonical model of a such game.
It is nevertheless of interest that the results that are reported on many
of the minority game papers regarding how an efficient use of the resources
in the model (i.e., the groups the agents intend to join) depend on the
richness of the space of predictors that the agents can use to form their
forecasts. The most efficient use of the resources seems to obtain when the
pool of predictors is neither too large nor too small, a condition described by
physicists as a “phase shift.” A canonical example of the type of papers, which
report findings of this sort, is that of Savit, Manuca, and Riolo (1997).
A concise summary of what is known about this game can be found in
Farmer (1999). I conjecture that many of the analytical methods used in the

present paper could be used to shed light on the puzzling facts of the minority
game simulations.
5.2. The El Farol Problem and Congestion Externalities

The purpose of this sub-section is to remark that this paper contributes to the
study of the kinds of congestion problems that arise through the interaction
of computer agents in a network like the Internet.
The reader may easily see how the El Farol problem falls within the class of
congestion externality problems: There is a resource (the bar) that provides
a better service when not so many people use it. Roads and network services,
among others, are resources subject to exactly the same kind of congestion.
The case of network services and the Internet are especially important since
computer scientists have had some resistance in employing the standard tools
of mathematical economics and game theory to study them. Interestingly,
the reason is that it has been argued that computational agents lack the
kind of sophistication that players are supposed to have according to game
theory and that therefore game-theoretic predictions about what would arise
in interactions among computer agents would not be of use.
This paper shows that this need not be the case, as the kind of algorithms
that define the manner in which computer agents interact over time can be
given a Savage-Bayesian interpretation. This opens the door for the tools of
the literature on learning in games to be used to study those interactions in
the hope that they provide an accurate prediction of the unfoldings of the
interaction. This is, in fact, what the research reported in this paper has done
for the case of the El Farol problem, which suggests that the standard tools
of game theory should be of tremendous utility in understanding the rapidly
growing world of network-based computation and interaction.

6. Conclusions
Proponents of bounded rationality models often argue that what makes ra
tional choice theory unbelievable is not that agents are supposed to have
well-defined objectives and that they act to achieve them, but that the agents’
choice occurs in a context in which they have detailed information about
the environment, perhaps under the form of a prior function defined over
a large and complicated state space. It is then reasonable for many to build
models with agents that select a standard best response subject to their fore
casts about the environment, and then having the forecasts be determined
by some model of adaptive learning, such as least squares learning, genetic
algorithms, pattern recognition, and so on.
The main point of this paper is to remark that this class of models of
bounded rationality can easily be made consistent with the standard Bayesian
decision-theoretic framework. This is so because the forecasting systems used
in these bounded rationality models induce a (possibly misspecified) prior

over the set of possible future outcomes that, conditional on any partial his
tory, assigns probability 1 to the set of possible futures that are consistent
with the outcome generated by the forecasting system given that history, and
probability zero elsewhere. As a consequence, these models of bounded ratio
nality are just as Bayesian rational as those models where the prior is explicitly
spelled out.
While this point has been made repeatedly in the theoretical literature
on Bayesian learning in games (see, e.g., Nachbar 1999, Kalai, Lehrer, and
Smorodinsky 1996, Nyarko 1997, and Jordan 1997), this insight has not fully
permeated into applied research conducted in the bounded rationality camp.
For this reason the contribution of this paper is to make this point by providing an
example of a famous model of bounded rationality from the computational economics
literature that fits into the standard Bayesian decision-theoretic framework.
Providing a solution to the El Farol problem turns out to be important
in its own right. Arthur’s model represents very well the central problem
from the public economics literature of understanding how resources that
are subject to congestion are used in society.
As the incredible interest that this problem has generated in the com
puter science and in the physics literature demonstrates, the results of this
paper open up many new avenues for research because the issues raised by
problems like the El Farol, and a deeper understanding of the relationship
between endogenous uncertainty, bounded rationality, congestion external
ities, and strategic interaction are far from being completely understood for
the general case. The reader is strongly encouraged to check Blume and
Easley (1998) and Nachbar (1997) to see why.
To conclude, let me reiterate my belief in that the research reported in
this paper illustrates the interplay that exists between computational model
ing and mathematical analysis. Both the El Farol problem and the minority
game have been the subject of many computational models. In this paper, I
am showing how we can use mathematics to explain what happens in these
computational models. This should not be interpreted as a demonstration
that mathematics always trumps computation. On the contrary, the two are
complementary. The computational models of open a new set of questions
and generate phenomena that we would like to understand fully. The math
ematics I present provides an explanation for some dimensions of these phe
nomena. They erase some of the mystery. In doing so, they enhance, not
diminish, the discovery of the phenomena themselves.

Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Assume that all players choose pure strategy a i , a number
between 0 and 100. Let F = #{i : a i < 60}. Notice that for each player i to
be best responding to the actions of all, i.e., to be maximizing the payoff
−|a i − F |, he or she would choose a i = F . Therefore, if there was an
equilibrium in pure strategies, it would have to have all players choosing

the same number. Therefore, F is either 0 or 100. If F = 0 then all players
choose a i = 0, so F = 100, which cannot be. If F = 100 then all players
choose a i = 100, so F = 0, which cannot be either. Hence, there is no
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. �
Proof of Lemma 2: Let p be a probability distribution on aggregate attendance,
i.e., on the set {0, 1, . . . , 100} that arises from the probabilistic choices of
all the players, each player i choosing action k with probability q ki . I first
1
show that there cannot be any mixed equilibria with 60
j =0 p ( j ) > 2 .
The expected payoff of a player choosing action k from the set
{0, 1, . . . , 100} given distribution p is u(k, p ) = − 100
j =0 p ( j )|k − j |. Now
compare u(60, p ) with u(k, p ) for k > 60:
100


u(k, p ) − u(60, p ) = −

p ( j )|k − j | −

j =0

=−
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j =0
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p ( j) j 
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This means that when 60
j =0 p ( j ) > 2 no player would want to choose a
1
number k above 60. Intuitively, this is so because when 60
j =0 p ( j ) > 2 the
median of the distribution p must be at most 60, and when players attempt
to minimize expected absolute loss function, as in this case, they will
want to choose a number as close to the median as possible.14 Here, any
number k above 60 must be farther to the median than 60 is. This means
that, given p, players will put probability zero on any strategy k > 60.
This, of course, means that p (100) = 1 and, consequently, 60
j =0 p ( j ) =
0, which contradicts our hypothesis.
A similar argument shows that there cannot be any mixed equilibria
1
with 60
j =0 p ( j ) < 2 . In this case no player would want to choose a number
k below 60, which would make p (0) = 1, contradicting our hypothesis.
1
Therefore, in any mixed equilibrium of this game, 60
j =0 p ( j ) = 2 and
60 is the median of the distribution over {0, 1, . . . , 100} of any mixed
equilibrium.
To show that the mean is just about 60, we first need to under
stand a few more properties of the mixed equilibria of this game. We
have shown above that if k = 60 then u(k, p ) − u(60, p ) ≤ 0. It turns out
1
that when 60
j =0 p ( j ) = 2 this can be refined, using arguments identical

14

See, for example, exercise 2.19 in Casella and Berger (1990).

to those given above, to: if k = 60, 61 then u(k, p ) − u(60, p ) < 0,
u(61, p ) = u(60, p ). I ommit the details here.
This means that in any mixed equilibrium all players put positive
probability only on the numbers 60 and 61, and the distribution p is
1
such that 60
j =0 p ( j ) = 2 . Therefore, the equilibrium distribution p arises
from the random choice of 100 players between actions 60 and 61, each
i
i
player randomizing independently with probabilities (q 60
, 1 − q 60
). In
other words, the 100 random choices can be thought as of 100 indepen
dent heterogeneous (e.g., not identically distributed) Bernoulli trials with
p being the distribution of the sum of the 100 trials. A remarkable fact
about heterogeneous Bernoulli trials, which is due to Jogdeo and Samuels
(1968)15 is that if the mean of the distribution p is an integer, then the
mean is the median. If the mean is not an integer, then the median is one
of the two adjacent integers. Therefore, the mean is within a distance of
one to the median. �
Proof of Theorem 3: Let P be a correlated equilibrium distribution of the
prediction game, and p the induced distribution over the number of
players who choose a number below 60. An argument similar to the
one used in the proof of Lemma (2) shows that if P (s i = k) > 0 then
60
1
i
j =0 p ( j | s = k) = 2 for all i. From this it follows that only 60 and 61
can have positive probability as strategies recommended to each player
i under P . The proof is complete when one shows that the prediction
about attendance according to p, and the prediction about attendance
according to p, conditional on s i , are the same. This follows from the Law
of Total Probability as follows:
60


p ( j) =

j =0

60


p ( j | s i = 60)P (s i = 60)

j =0

+

60


p ( j | s i = 61)P (s i = 61)

j =0

=

1
1
(P (s i = 60) + P (s i = 61)) = .
2
2

Therefore, the Nash and the correlated equilibrium distributions
coincide. �
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